This study examines the impact of malpractice reforms on physician behavior using a new measure of liability risk and a nationally representative, individual-level dataset of physicians. We first develop a theoretic model in which physicians are unable to fully insure against liability risk. We then match our liability measure to data on physician behavior from the Physician Practice Costs and Income Survey (PPCIS). Data from the PPCIS bracket a period of substantial state-level legal reform between 1983 and 1988, which provides identifying variation in our liability measure. We estimate the impact of liability reform on hours worked. We find an estimated elasticity of hours worked to liability exposure of -0.285 for the full sample of physicians. The interpretation is that a 10 percent increase in expected liability costs (not necessarily malpractice premiums) is associated with a 2.85 percent decrease in hours worked. The effect for physicians age 55 or older is much larger: We find an elasticity of -1.224 for this category. We also examine the link between our 'pure' liability measure and malpractice premiums. We find that an increase in $1 of expected liability is associated with a $0.699 to $1.05 increase in malpractice premiums, although there remains substantial unexplained variation in premiums after accounting for expected liability and observable demographic characteristics of physicians.
Introduction
Medical malpractice reform is the subject of ongoing debate among academics and policy makers. Critics of the current system point to several flaws. First, it does a poor job of identifying and compensating victims of negligent injury (Harvard Medical Practice Study, 1990 and Studdert and Brennan (2000) ). Second, its high administrative costs do not seem justified by estimates of deterrence McClellan 1996, 2002a) . Third, it creates inefficiencies in the practice of medicine. One aspect of these inefficiencies is commonly referred to as 'defensive medicine': actions taken by physicians (or other health-care providers) meant to reduce the probability of a malpractice lawsuit. Examples would include ordering an excessive number of diagnostic tests, or performing medical procedures of dubious value to a patient. By engaging in such behavior, physicians plausibly reduce the risk of a litigation claim, at the cost of an inefficient use of resources.
Perhaps the most well-known empirical economic papers on this topic are by McClellan (1996, 2002a) who examine how health expenditures for Medicare recipients vary with changes in state liability reforms. They find that up to 9 percent of expenditures on treatment for heart disease and heart attacks can be attributed to excessive care due to physicians practicing defensive medicine. 1 Other researchers tend to find smaller effects. Dubay et al (1999 Dubay et al ( , 2001 ) examine data on cesarean section procedures and also find an effect attributable to liability reform. In contrast, work by Sloan et al. (1995) and the Congressional Budget Office (2003) find little effect of liability reform on expenditures.
Although not typically thought of as defensive medicine, there is a related literature that examines how malpractice liability affects physician labor market participation. For example, Klick and Stratman (2005) examine the impact of liability reform on the number of physicians practicing in a given state. In a similar vein, Kessler et al. (2005) and Encinosa and Hellinger (2005) find that physician labor supply increases when states adopt caps limiting liability. 2 Additionally, there is substantial anecdotal evidence of physicians leaving particular specialties due to liability concerns which has fueled political attempts to institute malpractice litigation reform.
3
Our paper explores the link between liability risk and physician labor hours. This is a particularly interesting margin for analysis for at least two reasons. First, it seems likely that it will be related to the standard notion of defensive medicine because additional tests and procedures would probably require at least some additional hours of physician labor. Therefore, observing the extent that labor hours are affected by litigation risk would provide an auxiliary check on the extent of defensive medicine.
Second, it also seems plausible that if we observe physicians changing their behavior on the extensive margin by choosing not to participate in some specialties, or by leaving the practice of medicine altogether, it is possible that we might observe some action on the intensive margin as well. This could have implications for access to health care beyond the widely publicized physician exits observed in some specialties: a large number of physicians working shorter hours could have equilibrium effects of the same magnitude of physician exits on a smaller scale.
A key innovation of our paper is a new measure of liability, which allows us to exploit variation in liability risk across states and physician specialties, and its responsiveness to medical malpractice caps on liability awards. The measure is based on a combination of the Florida closed claim file, which contains all malpractice awards in the state of Florida, including 31 physician specialty categories, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners data on malpractice claims for all states from 1980 to 1988. Most previous work has used dummy variables to measure the impact of malpractice reform, but dummy variables mask considerable statutory variation across states. 4 For example, Table 1 lists the levels and types of state-level caps on damages.
On one extreme, Nebraska instituted a cap of $1.25 million on total damages, economic and noneconomic. On the other tail, neighboring state Kansas instituted a cap of $250,000 on noneconomic awards only. The dummy variable approach often treats both states the same, which seems likely to miss important differences in outcomes. As discussed below, states vary widely in their underlying liability risk so that the same nominal cap on malpractice awards may represent very different experiments in different states. Finally, as is well-known, different specialties vary greatly in their exposure to liability and hence different specialties undergo very different policy changes when a cap is implemented.
We begin the paper by outlining a theoretic model in which physicians are unable to fully insure against liability risk. We then develop the theoretical justification and empirical implementation of our measure of liability risk. Next, we match our liability measure with a nationally representative, individual-level dataset of physicians, the Physician Practice Costs and Income Survey (PPCIS, 1983 and 1988) . This data includes physician work hours and income, among other variables. These surveys bracket a period of substantial state-level reform, which provides the major source of identification in our empirical strategy.
5
We find an estimated elasticity of hours worked to liability exposure of -0.285 for the full sample of physicians. The interpretation is that a 10 percent increase in expected liability costs is associated with a 2.85 percent decrease in hours worked per week. The effect for physicians age 55 or older is much larger: We find an elasticity of -1.224 for this category. We also examine the link between our 'pure' liability measure and malpractice premiums. We find that an increase in $1 of expected liability is associated with a $0.699 to $1.05 increase in malpractice premiums.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretic model and its implications; Section 3 describes the data and the creation of the liability measure;
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
Labor Supply and Liability Exposure
We model a physician as choosing an optimal number of patients subject to an uncertain loss from malpractice liability, L(Q,α). 6 The loss depends upon both the number of patients treated, Q, and an exogenous scaling parameter, α. For expositional purposes, we assume that the support of the random variable L does not depend on Q or α. 7 L is assumed to be strictly increasing in Q and α--L Q >0, L α >0-and that L Qα >0 which implies that the marginal loss with respect to Q is increasing in α. The physician is risk-averse, has some market power, and chooses Q to maximize expected utility of profits where U π >0 and U ππ <0. The physician has a cost function c(Q), c Q >0 and c QQ >0, and faces an inverse demand curve, P(Q), P Q <0. We assume the physician purchases malpractice insurance at price p, but it does not cover all costs. L(Q,α) then is to be interpreted as net liability costs, after insurance payment. The maximization problem, along with first and second order conditions, is given by:
6 For an alternative perspective focusing just on malpractice premiums, see the model in Thornton (1997) . 7 For example, L(Q,α)=QR(α) where R is a lognormal random variable with mean α.
FOC:
We would like to know how optimal Q changes as the liability risk changes,
comparative statics using the first order condition are
Where EU Q represents the first order condition. The denominator is the second order condition and is therefore negative, which implies that the sign of the derivative will be the sign of the numerator. The equation for the numerator is given by
Perhaps surprisingly, the sign is ambiguous. The second term will be negative, implying that an exogenous increase in the expected liability would decrease the number of patients. However, the sign on the first term will depend on the sign of marginal profits, which can be either positive or negative depending on the weighting of marginal utility of profits in the first order condition.
Upon reflection, the intuition of this ambiguous result is straightforward: the risk of liability has two effects. First, it increases the marginal cost of treating a patient, thereby reducing the incentive to take on additional patients. This is the effect measured by the 2 nd , negative term. Second, it imposes a negative shock to income, reducing income and thereby making the treatment of an additional patient more valuable in expected utility terms. Which of these effects dominates is theoretically uncertain. 8 It is important to note that this model contrasts sharply with the view that malpractice premiums fully insure all potential losses from malpractice litigation. With this framework, physicians have an incentive to avoid actions that will increase potential liability costs even when paying malpractice premiums.
Data Description
We use three primary data sources: two are combined to construct our liability measure. We describe each of the data sources, and then turn to the creation of the liability measure. These cases predate any limitation on noneconomic damages in Florida and, regardless of the period of resolution, will not be covered by subsequent restrictions. We treat these as the distribution of potential payments resulting from actions taken by the doctor in the sample period. One feature of this approach is that we are capturing claims resolved years after the sample period. The three most recent claims in the data are resolved in 1999. One concern is that this long tail might be driving the results. For this reason we also estimate the model using only claims paid before 1987 and find similar results (see below).
3.1: Data on Physician Behavior -The Physician Practice Costs and Income Surveys
Our technique of simply truncating the sample for payments that are over the cap accords well with the reality of trial. With few exceptions, juries are not instructed of the existence of caps, and the award is reduced to the cap after the verdict is entered. More problematic is how to treat settlements. Over 93 percent of the cases that are not unilaterally dropped by the plaintiff end in settlement. Moreover plaintiffs win around 30 percent of the trials. Given the small number of cases that go to trial and receive a payment, we are unable to estimate the liability measure for each specialty using only cases that end in a trial. Our solution is to truncate all payments at the cap as described below. 12 There are models of settlement negotiation that would accord well with this approach. For example, Priest and Klein (1984) model litigation as a game in which the value of the case is known to both parties, but litigants diverge in their assessment of the likelihood of victory at trial. In their model, trials are errors but the value of the case is unaffected by trial or settlement. 13 See Born and Viscusi (1998) for a more extensive discussion of this data.
3.4: Description of Liability Index
A key aspect of our analysis is the construction and use of a measure of liability.
Ideally, we would like to have a measure of all liability awards by specialty, state, and year. With such a measure, we could directly evaluate the change in liability risk as various state-level regulations are modified. However, such data are not available and so,
as an alternative, we outline a methodology that allows us to create an index across all states and specialties, using the Florida closed claim data and the NAIC data.
3.4.1: Theoretical Justification
Our key assumption is that the unrestricted distribution of claims within a given specialty is similar across all states, up to a factor of proportionality, γ S . Specifically, let f(x|c) be the PDF of liability awards, x, conditional on specialty, c, in a given state where γ S is normalized to 1. Assuming a continuous distribution, the conditional mean for specialty c is represented by
Suppose that liability awards by specialty are proportional across states. Let y be the claims in state S. Using the change-of-variables technique we have the following: 
If we had a measure of γ S we could estimate this mean with data from the reference state, as well as the mean without the cap. 
3.4.2: Estimation of
where the numerator is the NAIC state estimate for liability claims in state i and year t, and the denominator is the weighted average of the Florida specialty claims where the weighting is the state and year specific measure of doctors in each specialty. We estimate γ for each state using all years from 1980 to 1986 where a state does not have a cap in place. Table 2 gives estimates of γ where Florida has been normalized to 1.
14 The estimates range from a high of 3.40 in New York to 0.17 in South Carolina.
3.4.3: Estimation of Liability Measure
Full details of our estimation are given in the appendix. We give a brief overview here. We assume that the distribution of awards in Florida is stable over the relevant time period implying that each year is drawn from the same underlying distribution. This allows us to reduce the noise from year-to-year variation in malpractice claims. The choice of 1980 to 1986 is driven by two factors: 1) 1980 was the first year that specialty designations were included with each claim; and 2) Florida began instituting malpractice reforms in 1986, including a cap on malpractice awards in 1988. 15 Thus we take the distribution of claims in the intervening period to be representative of an unrestricted claim environment. One concern is that Florida's ranking of liability risk differs from other states in a systematic way. For example, it is possible that given the large number of retirees living in Florida, liability risk might be relatively higher (or lower) for some specialties than in other states. We cannot address this concern directly. There is no publicly available data on liability payments that also contains detailed information on 14 The unnormalized measure of γ for Florida is 1.28. This implies that the NAIC measure of claims is somewhat larger than the Florida closed claim file. Given that the collection mechanisms and purposes of the two surveys are different, such a difference is not surprising. 15 In 1986, Florida abolished the collateral sources rule, limited joint and several liability, and restricted contingent fees. In 1988, Florida imposed a cap of $350,000 on noneconomic damages (see Klick and Stratman (2005) and Helland and Tabarrok (2003a) . From 1980 until 1985 Florida did have the English Rule (the "loser pays" provision). See Hughes and Snyder (1995) for the details of this liability change. The effects of this rule are potentially significant; however, it is unclear why this would systematically bias the results. Although the English Rule does appear to have moderately improved "case quality", this would seem to affect all specialties equally and hence is capture in Florida overall liability risk.
specialty. 16 In Appendix Americans and proportion in poverty -are quite similar to the rest of the US (see Helland and Tabarrok 2003b) . We address the ability of our measure to capture specialty risk using data on medical malpractice premiums in the results section.
We first adjust all awards to be measured in 1980 dollars. Then we compute an average award by specialty where the specialty designations are set by the Florida Department of Insurance (Table 3) . To compute the estimated liability for specialty s in state i when there is no cap, we multiply the state-specific γ by the average award by specialty. For example, the estimated γ for Ohio is 1.12 and the estimated average annual liability of a general surgeon in Florida is $4,961. Therefore we estimate the liability of an Ohio general surgeon to be $5,556. One potential issue is the small number of cases in certain specialties. For example, public health has only 7 claims in the sample period.
Clearly such small samples make estimating the liability for these specialties quite noisy.
Not surprisingly, specialties with small cell sizes in the Florida data are also those with small cell sizes in the PPCIS and hence they are unlikely to be driving the results.
To compute the effect of a cap, we truncate actual awards observed in Florida to the CPI adjusted award level in the particular state and then compute the sample mean implied by Equation (6) 17 We therefore apply this average rate to all awards in computing the effect of caps on noneconomic claims. Table 4 provides an example of the importance of cross-state differences in determining which doctors have actually been exposed to a policy change. 
Estimation Results
We examine the impact of liability on the physician labor market with two outcome variables: hours worked per year and hours worked per week. The surveys asked two questions: 1) how many hours did the physician work in the last full workweek?; and 2) how many vacation weeks did the physician take in the previous year? We expect that weekly hours will be relatively well measured by the survey. To construct an estimate of annual hours, we combine the two survey questions. We expect this measure to be relatively noisy due to the combined measurement error. index and x i are the control variables, including a set of county-level variables to account for local labor market conditions. We cluster the standard errors on state, specialty, and year. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 5 .
Impact of Changes in Liability on Hours Worked
The first empirical results are outlined in Table 6 . Column 1 gives the results of the regression of log of annual hours worked on the liability measure and a set of controls. Specialty, state, and year dummies, and county-level variables are included but are not reported due to space considerations.
The coefficient of interest is the liability measure. It is estimated to be -0.151, implying that a 10 percent increase in the malpractice premium is associated with a 1.51 percent decrease in hours worked, but this variable is statistically insignificant. There are no surprises with the control variables, and R-squared is 0.15 with 6,940 observations. This regression hints at an effect of liability on hours worked, but the evidence is not strong.
Column 2 reports on a similar regression that uses weekly hours rather than annual hours. In this specification the coefficient is indeed larger (in absolute value) at -0.285 than using annual hours, and it is statistically significant with a (asymptotic) tstatistic of 1.82. This estimate implies a relatively high sensitivity of labor hours to liability. Column 3 tests a subset of the data using just those physicians organized as sole
proprietorships. The idea with this specification is that sole proprietors might be more sensitive to liability concerns because of potentially less risk-sharing that can occur in large, multi-physician practices. Indeed, with this specification (Column 3), the estimated coefficient is substantially larger in absolute value at -0.660, and it is also statistically significant.
Column 4 modifies the Column 2 regression to add in an interaction term with liability and age. The motivation is as follows: anecdotal evidence suggests that a high expected liability will often induce exit from high-risk specialties. While our data do not allow us to measure entry or exit decisions directly, it allows us to test for an indirect effect. Rather than a dichotomous choice to simply work or not work in response to a change in liability risk, it is possible that liability risk accelerates the standard retirement pattern of working fewer hours near the end of the life cycle: If physicians face higher risk they will exit the profession gradually rather than simply stopping work abruptly.
To test this, we interact the liability measure with a counter variable that takes a value of 0 for ages less than 55, 1 at age 55, 2 at age 56, 3 at age 57, and so on. 18 The results are given in Column 4. The coefficient on liability, -0.278, is similar to the initial regression (Column 2) and it also remains statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is -0.00176 and is highly statistically significant with a t-statistic of -2.23. The magnitude is relatively small, though. The estimated elasticity for a 65-year-old physician is -0.297, or 0.019 points lower than physician age 55 or younger. Although small, these results do imply that liability has an increasing effect as physicians get older, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence of early retirement behavior in high-risk specialties. 18 We experiment with other specification, using younger and older ages. There was not much of an effect below 55 and specification starting after 55 tended to show larger coefficients on the interaction.
To examine this age effect more directly, we restrict the sample to physicians who are age 55 or older and rerun the regression. The results are reported in Column 5. In this specification, the liability measure is very large relative to previous estimates, -1.224
and a t-statistic of 3.12. This estimate implies that a 10 percent increase in the malpractice liability risk is associated with a 12 percent decrease in hours worked. This result is consistent with the specification using the full sample implying that older physicians respond strongly to liability risk.
Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks
Next we estimate a set of regressions using alternative specifications to check the implications and robustness of our results. First, we estimate a set of specifications with alternative measures of liability reform. Column 1 reports the results using a dummy variable for whether a state has any cap on malpractice awards. This dummy variable specification is similar to previous empirical work investigating the impact of liability reform. As our baseline specification, we use the log (weekly hours) regression reported from Table 6 , Column 2, but we replace our continuous liability measure with a dummy variable. The estimated coefficient is -0.001 with a standard error of 0.014. We next estimate the model with two dummy variables, one for whether there is a cap on the total award, and one for whether there is a cap on noneconomic awards. Again the estimated coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, -0.005 for both parameters.
It is often the case that when states reform their legal system, they do so with a host of other changes so it is possible that our liability measure is picking up the marginal effects of these other changes. In Column 3, we add in a set of dummy variables for other state laws affecting medical-malpractice liability, and we also include our liability measure. Caps on total awards are still statistically insignificant, and the liability measure is actually larger and more statistically significant than in the baseline regression from In Column 4 of Table 7 we address another issue. In our discussion of the creation of the liability measure, we noted that many of cases in the Florida data are filed before 1987 but take many years to resolve. To avoid this long tail we estimate the model truncating the sample to cases decided before 1987. We find a very similar effect as before, with an estimated elasticity of labor supply of -0.268 and a t-statistic of -2.20.
Column 5 reports the results of an instrumental variables regression accounting for taxes. Thurston and Showalter (1997) using the 1983 cross section of the PPCIS find that marginal tax rates have a significant effect on physician labor supply for some segments of the physician populations (e.g. sole proprietors). Given the relatively large tax change from the 1986 federal tax reform, it is possible that the change in labor hours is reflective of changes in the marginal tax rates rather than the change in the liability risk. Column 5 reports the results when the Thurston/Showalter specification with endogenous taxes is run, including our liability measure. We find that the coefficient is even larger than when taxes are not accounted for, -0.441, and statistically significant (t= -2.58).
Finally, in Column 6 we report the results using log (income) as the dependent variable. Income is reported as a gross measure, but it has several problems. For one, it is measured categories and so actual income is not observed. 19 We also do not observe the details of contracts with hospitals or physician working groups to account for who is paying malpractice premium. But income offers a potentially interesting check on our labor-hour regressions because if physicians are cutting back on hours, it would probably show up in lower income as well. This regression has fewer observations in this specification, 6,240 versus 7,104 in the weekly hours regression, due to a lower response rate for the income questions. The liability effect is again negative and significant at the 10 percent level with a t-statistic of -1.95. This is consistent with what we find in the labor hours regressions.
Liability Measure And Malpractice Premiums
We next test the link between our liability measure and self-reported malpractice premiums. Our liability measure is admittedly imperfect, but if it is capturing anything of interest it ought to be correlated with observed malpractice premiums. The PPCIS asked physicians for the dollar amount of their malpractice premiums. This measure is also quite noisy: a given physician's malpractice premium can be complicated by joint arrangements in multi-physician practices and by arrangements through other parties such as hospitals. In Table 8 , we report the results of regressing the self-reported measure of malpractice premiums on our liability measure. Column 1 uses only a constant and the liability measure. In this regression the coefficient on liability is 0.699 with a t-statistic of 11.1. Note that this estimate is without control variables. Our liability measure is highly correlated with observed premiums and alone can explain 18 percent of the variance. Given the measurement problems with both variables, this result is surprisingly strong. It is also heartening that the number implies that a $1 increase in liability is associated with a nearly equal increase in the observed malpractice premium.
Column 2 adds in some physician-specific control variables and the county-level variables. The estimated coefficient is almost the same, 0.684, with a t-statistic of 12.9.
Column 3 adds in state, specialty, and year controls. These additional variables decrease the estimated coefficient substantially to 0.225, but it is still highly statistically significant. Taken together, these results indicate a strong, positive relationship between actual liability and observed malpractice premiums although we are hesitant to place a great deal of faith in the exact coefficient estimates because we know little about the actual underlying insurance contracts.
Because of the ambiguity over how malpractice premiums are actually set (Baicker and Chandra, 2006) , we reestimate using only claims adjudicated through 1986, rather than claims that were adjudicated up through then end of the 1990s. This might be a better approximation to the information that insurers used in setting malpractice premiums during this period. The results are found in Columns 4 through 6. The results are similar to those found previously, although the coefficient estimates are closer to 1, suggesting a dollar-for-dollar link between expected liability and malpractice premiums.
Selection Issues
The results indicate that physicians decrease their labor supplied in the face of rising liability costs. Further, this impact is particularly important among physicians over age 55. However, these estimates likely represent a lower bound on the impact of liability on physician labor supply. First, because we are not estimating specialty choice, we cannot control for any selection that might occur due to liability considerations.
Although Bhattacharya (2005) finds no evidence that specialty choice is influenced by liability exposure, it is possible that those doctors least responsive to changes in liability self select into high-liability specialties and are the least responsive to changes in liability. A second reason that our estimates represent lower bounds is that our sample contains only physicians who work more than 20 hours a week. Thus complete retirement and part-time work would not be captured in our estimates.
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the impact of medical malpractice liability on physician labor supply. We add to the theoretical literature on the topic by developing a model of physician labor supply that accounts for risk-avoidance behavior in the presence of insurance contracts. We then test the implications of the model with data formed by combining two unique data sources: 1) First, we develop a new measure of liability risk based on actual liability award data in Florida, combined with aggregate award data from other states. Our measure of liability risk varies by specialty, state, and the details of existing medical-malpractice award caps. The measure contrasts with the more typical approach of using dummy variables to indicate the existence of a cap. 2) Second, we use individual-level data from two nationally representative cross sections of physicians: the Physician Practice Costs and Income Surveys (PPCIS) from 1984 and 1988. These two surveys contain detailed information on physicians and practice behavior. Additionally, these surveys bracket a period of significant state-level activity in instituting liability caps, providing the primary econometric identification for our liability measure.
We find that increases in liability decrease the number of hours a physician works. The effect is strongest for physicians who are age 55 or older, and the effect increases modestly with age. The fact that the impact on hours worked is largest among physicians over 55 is consistent with previous research, which finds the largest impact of liability on retirements (Kessler et al. 2005) . Sole proprietors also exhibit a relatively strong reaction to variation in liability risk
This observed sensitivity of hours worked to liability risk is potentially important in the context of the current political debate over whether to have a nationwide cap on malpractice awards. There are many anecdotes and some firm empirical work concerning the impact of liability risk on physician exit from high-risk specialties such as obstetrics and surgery. What our results show is that there are also labor effect on the intensive margin-physician behavior other than the participation decision-thereby suggesting a larger effect of medical malpractice liability than previously thought. In particular, access to health care can be affected not only by physician exit, but also by physicians cutting back on their hours worked.
We also find that our liability measure is highly correlated with a self-reported measure of malpractice premiums. Although this result is to be expected by economists, the previous empirical work is ambiguous on the link between liability claims and malpractice premiums. As discussed in Baicker and Chandra (2004) , malpractice premiums are influenced by several mechanisms including multiple years worth of liability exposure, investment returns, and the competitive climate.
Finally, the relatively simple exercise of comparing the effect of a given dollarlevel cap in malpractice awards suggests that the impact of a cap can vary widely from state to state. This variation comes from two sources: the legal environment in a given state and its propensity to generate large malpractice awards, and the health care environment and its general level of cost. This observed variation would seem to suggest that having a uniform nationwide standard on malpractice awards might not be optimal.
But this point is worthy of additional research that would account for the various tradeoffs involved.
Data Appendix
Estimated factors of proportionality (γs) were computed as follows:
1) NAIC collects firm-level data on medical malpractice claims by state and year. We aggregated this data to estimate a total claims incurred for each state and year from 1980 to 1986. The resulting variable we will refer to as NAIC (year, state)
2) Using doctor counts by specialty from the AMA Masterfile of physicians, we constructed a count of the number of doctors for each year, 1980-1986, in 3) Using the Florida closed claim file, we computed a total dollar value of claims filed in each year for each specialty. We then divided these numbers by the number of Florida doctors in that specialty for that year using the results from step 2. This gives an average claim per doctor, by specialty and year which we refer to below as AVGCLAIM(specialty,year,FL).
4) Following Equation 9
in the text, we then compute an estimate of the total claims filed in each state-year combination by multiplying AVGCLAIM*DOCCOUNT and summing over specialty. The resulting variable we refer to as TOTCLAIM (year, state).
5)
We then compute a 'raw' factor of proportionality, γ, by dividing NAIC (year, state) by TOTCLAIM(year, state). Then the average value for the 7 years is computed for each state, except for states that imposed a cap on liability awards between 1983 and 1988. For those states we only average over the non-capped years. We then normalize the γs by the value for Florida and use the result to adjust claims to compute the liability measure as outlined below.
Estimating the liability measure for each state, year, and specialty
The liability measure was computed using the following algorithm: Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses: by year, state and specialty. All regressions contain the following control variables: a constant and dummy variables for year, state, physician specialty, and county-level countrols for doctors per 1000 residents, hospitals per 1000 residents, hospital beds per 1000 residents, percent population enrolled in HMO, median income, percent urban, percent black, percent below poverty line, percent age 0-14, percent age 65 or older. F-tests in Columns (4) and (6) test joint significance of liability and the interaction term. The interaction term, "Ln(Liability)*(Age-54)," takes a value of 0 for physicians under age 55. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses: by year, state and specialty. All regressions contain the following control variables: a constant and dummy variables for year, state, physician specialty, and county-level countrols for doctors per 1000 residents, hospitals per 1000 residents, hospital beds per 1000 residents, percent population enrolled in HMO, median income, percent urban, percent black, percent below poverty line, percent age 0-14, percent age 65 or older, age, age squared male, solo practice (0/1), board certified (0/1), foreign medical school graduate (0/1), racial categories: asian, black, hispanic. Column (5) includes Ln(1-marginal tax rate) as an explanatory variable. It is instrumented with Ln(1-MSTR) where MSTR is the highest marginal state tax rate in the state of residence. F-tests in Columns (4) and (6) test joint significance of liability and the interaction term. The interaction term, "Ln(Liability)*(Age-54)," takes a value of 0 for physicians under age 55. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
